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Abstract: According to Chomsky and his followers, language as a biological 
phenomenon is a property of individual minds and brains; its status as a social phenomenon is 
merely epiphenomenal, and not a proper object of scientific study. On a rival view, the 
individual's biological capacity for language cannot be properly understood in isolation from 
the linguistic environment, which it both depends on for its operation and – in collaboration 
with other speakers – builds and shapes for future generations. 
I argue here for the rival view by demonstrating firstly its greater consonance with 
several themes in current biological theory, and secondly its ability to answer two well-
known philosophical challenges to generative linguistics due to Quine and Kripke. 
 
*** 
 
According to Noam Chomsky and his followers, the only proper object of study for a 
biologically-informed science of linguistics is the I-Language; the idiolect realised by the 
mind/brain of each individual speaker.  Let us – mischievously, perhaps – call this a 
‘Thatcherite’ view of language; there is no such thing as linguistic society as far as 
Chomskyans are concerned, just individual men and women. And it follows on this view that 
linguistics is not normative; there are no external public standards against which a mature 
speaker may be judged to have erred in her speech. 
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This view runs directly counter to another, more collectivist attempt to take language 
seriously as a biological phenomenon – a distinctive part of the ‘natural history’ (Wittgenstein 
1953, §25, §415) of the human species. Various arguments have been made for this 
alternative view of language, which are brought together here for the first time. On this 
account, language is an inherently social and public phenomenon, and is as such necessarily 
governed by normative rules; it is intrinsically the sort of thing that we can ‘get wrong’ by the 
lights of our peers.1 
In this paper I identify tensions between the Chomskyan view and several current trends 
in evolutionary biological theory. I provide for the first time an outline of the collectivist view 
and, while I do not give new arguments for it here, I demonstrate that it sits more comfortably 
with the most plausible current hypotheses about how the human language faculty might have 
evolved. Following this survey of the landscape, I then show that the resulting ‘neo-
Saussurean’ view of language also resolves two influential philosophical challenges to 
Chomsky’s generative linguistics, due to W.V. Quine and Saul Kripke. Both Chomsky’s 
signature project of a generative theory of linguistics, and his aspiration to a true 
                                                          
1 The distinction I draw here is not that identified by e.g. Kim Sterelny (2016, p. 173-4) 
between the Chomskyan, generativist view of language and its evolution, and a rival 
tradition treating it as ‘a complex, coadapted system of communication’ which in large part 
arises through social interaction and iterated learning rather than ‘hardwiring’ in the brain. 
The communitarian views I consider here remain generativist in nature and, though they 
modify Chomsky’s nativist commitments, are similarly impressed by ‘poverty of the 
stimulus’ arguments; so this is an internal dispute within generativism. That being said, 
these views have clear affinities with those Sterelny discusses, and perhaps lay the ground 
for future rapprochement between the traditions. 
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‘biolinguistics’, I therefore argue, are best served by dropping his Thatcherite commitments 
to an individualist and anti-normative ontology of language. 
 
I: The ‘Thatcherite’ Picture  
The basic outlines of Chomsky’s generative linguistics are well known, and need not be 
repeated here. What will be relevant to note is a pair of distinctions he introduced regarding 
the proper object of linguistic study. He distinguished initially between linguistic 
‘competence’ and ‘performance,’ or the ‘abstract knowledge of language acquired by the 
child and possessed by the adult’ and the ‘concrete linguistic phenomena produced and heard 
by the speaker’ (Glackin 2011, p.202). This replaced, among generative linguists, the old 
Saussurean distinction between parole, which corresponded closely to performance, and 
langue, the common resource of public language (Saussure 1983, pp.13-15 & passim).2 The 
study of performance, or parole, in the eyes of Chomsky and his followers, could not be 
                                                          
2 Saussure (1983), a posthumously-published selection of lecture notes, is not abundantly 
clear in stating the distinction. But roughly, langue is regarded as the proper object of study 
for linguistics, and is both ‘a social product of our language faculty … [and] a body of 
necessary conventions adopted by society to enable members of society to use their 
language faculty’ (p.9-10). It is an abstract resource; ‘a fund accumulated by the members of 
the community through the practice of speech (parole), a grammatical system existing 
potentially in every brain, or more exactly in the brains of a group of individuals,’ and ‘is 
never complete in any single individual, but exists perfectly only in the collectivity’ (p. 13). 
By contrast, ‘there is nothing collective about parole,’ which includes both writing and 
speech; ‘its manifestations are individual and ephemeral’ (p. 19); it represents the actual 
utterances made by individual speakers.  
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regarded as the subject of a properly scientific linguistics; its data were transitory, 
unsystematic, unrepeatable, unmeasurable. Following what was termed the ‘Galilean’ 
strategy, the proper object of linguistic study was considered to be the ‘ideal’ law-like 
language, independent of the imperfect observable data through which it manifested itself.  
But this, in turn, was increasingly conceived of as a specialised neural module; as 
something biological rather than public. Accordingly, the Saussurean langue was soon 
likewise dismissed as part of ‘E-language’, at most an external, epiphenomenal result of the 
real scientifically significant phenomenon, the ‘I-language’ in the individual speaker’s brain 
(Hornstein 1998, p.340). Accordingly, from Chomsky (1986) onward, competence and 
performance were superseded by ‘I-language’ and ‘E-language’, respectively. I-language is 
intentional, individual, and internal; the neural and mental structures possessed by an 
individual speaker which generate grammatical strings of words (Chomsky 1986, ch.2; 
Chomsky 1995, p.25ff.; Chomsky 2000; Isac & Reiss 2008). E-language is whatever in 
language is not I-language; it is extensional, external, and collective. Its correct definition 
does not matter; ‘we can define E-language in one way or another or not at all, since the 
concept appears to play no role in the theory of language’ (1986, p. 26). But it is meant to 
include both individual utterances (a la ‘performance’) and abstract public objects such as 
‘the French language’. Linguists would also be largely unconcerned with how the I-language 
states of the brain ‘got there’ in evolutionary terms, and rejected the idea that it was ‘for’ 
communication or anything else; such questions were simply not part of the new science of 
linguistics. 
For Chomsky and his followers then, insofar as it exists, public language is simply an 
epiphenomenal product, composed of numerous individual speakers and their brain-
structures. And in a strictly mereological and synchronic sense, this is of course correct. It is 
uninformative, however, about how these I-language structures came to be in human brains, 
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which Chomsky does not consider an interesting or fruitful area of scientific enquiry (e.g. 
Chomsky 1972, p.97 ; Chomsky 1988; Chomsky 2002, p.146; Fitch et al. 2005, p.189). 
That it has something to do with the genes is not in question. Chomsky himself spoke of 
the neural ‘Language Acquisition Device’ (LAD) posited by generative linguistics as both a 
‘linguistic genotype’ and a ‘genetic program’ (1980, p.75; p. 244. For a comprehensive view 
of the pervasiveness of this picture among generativists, see Lorenzo & Longa 2009, p.1302). 
The bulk of grammar, on the classic ‘Principles and Parameters’ generativist view, is 
genetically encoded, with the contribution of the environment only marginal or secondary. 
The later ‘Minimalist Programme’ adds an important third factor in the form of general 
principles not specific to language, but a significant shaper of language remains ‘(g)enetic 
endowment, apparently nearly uniform for the species, which interprets part of the 
environment as linguistic experience’ (Chomsky 2005, p.6). But how this genetic endowment 
might have evolved does not interest the traditional generative linguist; ‘Chomsky and 
others’, as one supporter notes, ‘have consistently resisted facile adaptationist stories of the 
sort that populates the evolutionary psychology literature’ (Boeckx 2012, p.493). 
The concept of genetic information at work here in Chomsky’s theory is explicitly the 
‘program metaphor’ developed by the likes of Ernst Mayr (e.g. 1961), Jacques Monod (1970), 
and François Jacob (1970); ‘(a)ll manifestations of development are controlled by genetic 
programs’ (Mayr 1982, p.106). On this ‘neo-preformationist’ view,3 the environment merely 
‘triggers’ the otherwise inevitable development of whatever phenotypic properties the genes 
instruct. As the Minimalist Programme has downgraded the role of genes, Chomsky has in 
recent years pointed to links between his theory and evolutionary developmental biology 
                                                          
3 See Griffiths & Stotz (2000, p.34); for specific application of the position to Chomsky, see 
Lorenzo & Longa (2009, p.1305-7). 
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(‘Evo-Devo’), which stresses the importance of the role played by embryonic and later 
developmental processes, and modifications to them, in evolutionary change (2007a; 2010). 
But as Antonio Benítez-Burraco and Víctor Longa have argued (2010), the particular form of 
Evo-Devo which Chomsky is interested in preserves the preformationism of his earlier view; 
that is, following Seán Carroll (2005), development remains a matter of switching structural 
genes on and off at the appropriate times, a process itself predetermined by the genetic 
program (e.g. Chomsky 2007a, p.3). 
 
II: The Communitarian Picture 
In recent years, however, this ‘genocentric’ and reductionist understanding of 
evolutionary processes has come to seem rather less tenable to many biological theorists. 
Indeed, the very notion of ‘genetic information’ has increasingly been regarded as confused. 
According to Susan Oyama’s influential ‘parity thesis’, it no more makes sense to posit that 
the inherited ‘blueprint’ for a given phenotype is encoded in the genes, considered 
independently of the environment in which they are expressed, than to locate the same 
blueprint in the environment, with the genes’ role relegated to ‘carrying out’ the plan by 
building proteins as and when instructed (Oyama 1985). Thus, Developmental Systems 
Theory (DST) has stressed that the effect of genes – in and of themselves, ‘among the most 
impotent and useless materials imaginable’ (West-Eberhard 2003, p.93) – can be understood 
only within the wider context of molecular, cellular, organism-wide, and environmental 
interactions.4 There is obviously a trivial sense in which, holding these other factors constant, 
genomic differences will determine differences in phenotypic outcome. But it is equally the 
                                                          
4 See e.g. Oyama (1985); Griffiths & Gray (1994); Richardson (2000); Robert et al. (2001); 
and the essays collected in Oyama et al. (2001). 
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case that, if the genome is held constant, any phenotypic differences must be due to the other 
factors; yet nobody supposes that the environment has ‘programmed’ what differences there 
are between monozygotic twins (Dupré 2008b, p.88). 
 A related trend in recent evolutionary theory emphasises the fact that the modification 
by organisms of their environment, and the consequent inheritance of environmental 
conditions, are important evolutionary processes in their own right. Beginning with the work 
of Richard Lewontin (1982; 1983; 2000), ‘Niche Construction Theory’ (NCT) has stressed 
the dialectical relation between organisms and the ecological ‘niches’ in which they reside. 
Thus, we should not regard natural selection as ‘fitting’ organisms to pre-existing 
environments; rather, organism and environment constantly re-shape each other in a dynamic 
and reciprocal fashion (e.g. Godfrey-Smith 1996; Laland & Sterelny 2006; Krakauer et al. 
2009). The cultural environment of humans represents a key case in point; we are selected for 
our ability to thrive in an environment rich with culturally learned and transmitted 
knowledge, but that environment is itself the direct product of our and our ancestors’ evolved 
behaviour (Odling-Smee & Laland 2012). So neither our genes nor their cultural context can 
be considered independently of each other; they evolve together in a relationship of mutual 
causal and conceptual dependence (e.g. Feldman & Laland 1996; Laland et al. 2001; Laland 
et al. 2010). 
These closely-linked biological theories remain controversial, and I cannot present an 
argument for them in the space available here. However, the difficulties they present for the I-
language perspective should be readily apparent. Chomsky and his followers conceive of the 
individual’s genome as containing all the information necessary for construction of an LAD, 
which needs only to be ‘switched on’ by the appropriate linguistic environment for the 
phenotypic effect of I-language to be produced. But this is just the sort of picture which the 
parity thesis declares incoherent, and which the growing DST literature seemingly shows to 
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be at best deeply simplistic about how genetic differences are realised in phenotypic 
outcomes. Serious doubt is cast, too, on the ‘merely mereological’ picture of the E-language. 
While some collective and social phenomena may be understood simply as the sum of 
evolved individual behaviours, what NCT purports to show is that it is far more usual for the 
individual behaviour itself also to be simultaneously an evolved response to the already-
existing social context.5 There is thus typically a relation of cyclical and reciprocal 
accommodation between the two perspectives; and if human language conforms to this 
pattern, then a linguistics focussing exclusively on the I-language perspective would be a 
severely diminished and myopic explanatory science.6 
                                                          
5 Dupré (2008a, p.73) provides an instructive non-biological analogy; ‘The [Albert Cuypstraat 
street market in Amsterdam] depends for its existence on the people who go there to buy and 
sell; but it is simultaneously the power of the market that attracts the people that constitute its 
continued existence’. Cf. Dupré (2008b, p.95). 
6 For what it’s worth, I don’t think rejecting the ‘extended evolutionary synthesis’ would do 
much to rescue Chomsky’s position. To see why, consider Maynard Smith’s (2000) classic, 
orthodox account of biological information. Defining information causally, as he writes, we 
get the parity thesis; ‘there is no difficulty in saying that a gene carries information about 
adult form; an individual with the gene for achondroplasia will have short arms and legs. 
But we can equally well say that a baby’s environment carries information about growth; if 
it is malnourished, it will be underweight’ (p.189). This won’t do for the Chomskyan, who 
regards the genes and not in any interesting sense the langue as carrying the information 
specifying the developmental path of the I-language. Nor would it do for Maynard Smith, 
who similarly wished to justify the use of informational language ‘to characterize genetic as 
opposed to environmental causes’ (ibid.). Maynard Smith’s solution was instead to define 
biological information semantically, arguing that ‘the distinction can be justified only if the 
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That language does conform to this pattern is just what the recent, strikingly 
convergent, accounts of language and its evolution that I have described as ‘neo-Saussurean’ 
urge. These views, developed by Stephen Anderson, Eva Jablonka and her collaborators, and 
myself, are all in essence generativist; they hold that the basic account of the structure and 
acquisition of grammar elaborated over the years by Chomsky and his followers is correct. 
That is, in brief, the infant’s brain contains a specialised mechanism for acquiring language, 
which operates during a particular developmental window; the principles encoded in that 
mechanism, in turn, tightly constrain the grammatical rules permissible in any language 
                                                          
concept of information is used in biology only for causes that have the property of 
intentionality… A DNA molecule has a particular sequence because it specifies a particular 
protein, but a cloud is not black because it predicts rain. This element of intentionality 
comes from natural selection’ (p 189-90). But drawing the distinction in this way doesn’t 
help the Chomskyan either, for two reasons. Firstly, if we draw the distinction in this way, it 
is insufficient to differentiate between genetic and social-environmental causal influences on 
the development of an individual’s language faculty. That is to say – like DNA but unlike 
rain clouds – any given langue or E-language has the configuration it does precisely because 
it functions to shape the linguistic development of its eventual participants in the way that it 
does. Both genetic and environmental causes of linguistic development are therefore equally 
intentional, and carry information in the same way. Secondly, and inconveniently, Chomsky 
has specifically denied on many occasions that the I-language is an adaptation, positing 
instead that it is a side-effect of selection for cognitive recursion (e.g. Berwick & Chomsky 
2016, p. 66, 71). If this is the case our genes do not carry semantic, but only causal, 
information regarding the I-language, and Chomsky’s ‘genetic programme’ falls on the non-
intentional side of Maynard Smith’s distinction. I thank an anonymous referee for pressing 
me on this point. 
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which is learned during this window, creating the familiar stock of linguistic universals 
shared by all human languages. Where these views diverge from the orthodox Chomskyan 
picture is in the robust hypotheses they issue about the sort of evolutionary processes that are 
likely to have produced the LAD, given the specific details of the languages it produces,7 and 
the implications of these evolutionary hypotheses for the relation between the linguistic 
capacity contained in the individual speaker’s brain, and the linguistic environment in which 
it is formed. Chomsky and his followers, they urge, can avail of an updated view of 
evolutionary biology which had been regarded as unavailable, resulting in a better version of 
generativism. 
All three theories make central use of the so-called ‘Baldwin Effect’, a quasi-
Lamarckian process which allows learned behaviour to be progressively ‘assimilated’ into the 
genome. If a given learned behaviour significantly advances fitness, then there may be 
selection pressure for the ability to learn the behaviour with ease and alacrity. Thus, 
organisms whose initial, pre-learning neural structures need the least ‘rewiring’ to achieve the 
post-learning state begin to dominate the population, and the learned behaviour becomes 
more ubiquitous; this intensifies the selection pressure, setting up a positive feedback loop, 
which drives the population steadily towards ‘already’ knowing – or instinctively acquiring – 
the behaviour which their ancestors had to expend valuable cognitive resources learning and 
teaching.8 
                                                          
7 e.g. Glackin (2011, p.208-11) points out that Baldwin effects, by ‘self-terminating’, explain 
the otherwise puzzling fact that the principles of Universal Grammar have unset parameters 
and, consequently, the vast diversity of human languages. 
8 The essays in eds. Weber & Depew (2003) remain the most thorough overview of the field, 
though Sznajder et al. (2012) is more up-to-date. 
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Jablonka – a self-described ‘neo-Lamarckian’ – is one of the foremost theorists of 
epigenetic inheritance, or ‘the transmission of phenotypic variations that do not stem from 
differences in DNA base sequence from one generation of cells or organisms to the next’ 
(Jablonka & Lamm 2012, p.19). Older, gene-based models of heredity, Jablonka and her co-
authors argue, cannot explain the evolution of learned symbolic and other cultural traditions – 
including language – among humans or other animals, ‘because learning involves 
developmentally-mediated acquisition and transmission of variations’ (Jablonka & Lamb 
2008, p.393). So the development of the LAD must be understood as the result of a complex 
interaction between our ancestors and their cognitive niche; as language becomes ubiquitous 
in a population, the ability to master conventions for manipulating symbols becomes crucial, 
and a Baldwin Effect begins. As the cognitive resources needed for learning are freed up by 
this process, more complex behaviours become available to the learner, and as they become 
ubiquitous are themselves progressively assimilated in what Jablonka and her colleagues term 
the ‘assimilate-stretch’ principle (e.g. Dor & Jablonka 2000, p.46; Jablonka & Lamb 2005, 
p.290). 
Anderson proceeds from a rather different set of – specifically linguistic – 
considerations. Human language, he observes, shows clear signs of being the product of 
evolutionary processes: it is (contrary to linguists’ dogma – see Carstairs-McCarthy 2011) 
variable across the population, and that variation seems to be both heritable and adaptive 
(Anderson 2013, s.1.1–1.3; see also Pinker & Bloom 1990). But this claim is widely supposed 
to run counter to another widespread intuition about language, that its form and features are 
best explained in terms of its ‘external’, functional or processing requirements (Anderson 
2008, p.795. See e.g. Bickerton 2011, p.459-60; Lightfoot 2011, p.316). The tension between 
the two explanations, Anderson shows, is illusory; via a Baldwin Effect, linguistic 
conventions may be developed and adopted for functional reasons, then subsequently 
assimilated into the genetically endowed language faculty. So a particular functional feature 
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of grammar, like conforming to the principle of subjacency, becomes adaptive not for its 
intrinsic features, but by virtue of its prevalence in existing usage (Anderson 2011, pp.368-9).  
I have pointed out, in turn, that this sort of cyclical assimilative process is the only 
explanation that would not make the evolution of a highly functional Chomskyan LAD 
implausibly dependent upon evolutionary saltations (Glackin 2011, pp.204-6). Each new rule 
or stage of grammatical complexification requires a discrete advance; but this can be 
accomplished by innovations at the level of linguistic performance, governed by general 
intelligence, and thereafter gradualistically assimilated. One notable upshot of this hypothesis, 
I argue, is the dissolution of Chomsky’s principled distinction between competence and 
performance, or I-language and E-language; I-language is now regarded as the product of a 
complex interaction between the E-language and an LAD which is itself composed of that 
part of the E-language which at some point in evolutionary history became sufficiently 
ubiquitous to generate its own selection pressures (2011, pp.217-8).9 
A further consequence is the rehabilitation of that part of the E-language which 
Saussure termed the langue, the communal ‘fund’ of linguistic resources which ‘is never 
complete in any single individual, but exists perfectly only in the collectivity … only in virtue 
of a kind of contract agreed between the members of a community’ (Saussure 1983, pp.13-4). 
No longer just the mereological sum of individual speech-acts, langue is elevated by the 
Baldwin Effect hypotheses to a doubly central position in the causal understanding of 
biolinguistics. That is to say, it represents both the environmental niche which co-evolved 
with and today makes sense of the human language faculty, and the presupposed 
                                                          
9 There are instructive parallels between the fossilisation of these ‘subsequently basic’ elements 
of grammar and the idea of ‘generative entrenchment’ in evolutionary theory developed by 
Bill Wimsatt (e.g. Wimsatt 2001). 
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informational context in whose absence an inert neural LAD could not make any meaningful 
contribution to human development. 
It is for this reason that I have termed the communitarian views in question ‘neo-
Saussurean’ versions of generativism. Though they certainly do not share all of Saussure’s 
assumptions, the key feature which distinguishes them from the more orthodox generativists 
is this understanding that language can neither be conceived as existing abstractly, outside the 
minds of individual speakers, nor as being entirely reducible to what is in their minds. Langue 
and parole, Saussure argued, are ‘closely linked and each presupposes the other. Langue is 
necessary in order that parole should be intelligible and produce all its effects. But parole 
also is necessary in order that langue may be established’ (1983, p.19).10 Likewise, for the 
neo-Saussureans, I-language and langue both causally and conceptually presuppose each 
other. I-language is not a stand-alone faculty, but an adaptation to and for life in the linguistic 
milieu of langue; the same langue is both composed of the speech generated by all the 
relevantly proximate I-languages now in existence, and structured by their fossilised 
ancestors. 
Linguistic competence as embodied in the I-language is indeed biological, then, and 
based in the individual brain; but to understand it, we can’t ignore the ‘non-biological’ 
element of language. Or rather, and more accurately, we can’t dismiss the social element as 
non-biological. Human biology is the study of a thoroughgoingly social animal, and the 
lesson we learn from modern rejections of the biological/social distinction is that 
biolinguistics, as such, must take account of the intrinsically social element of human 
language. The ‘developmental niche’ a child occupies is not just the external stimulus which 
                                                          
10 For clarity and consistency, I have restored the original terms to the translation; Harris uses 
the more natural, but more ambiguous, ‘language’ and ‘speech’. 
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triggers the LAD, but its origin and source; the functioning of I-language can only be 
understood in terms of its cyclical interaction with langue. 
I have given an overview of the existing arguments for the neo-Saussurean picture of 
language so far, without adding any new support. Nevertheless, the convergence between the 
conclusions of these independent arguments by Anderson, Jablonka and her collaborators, 
and myself, which has not been previously noted in the literature, provides additional 
abductive evidence for each of them, and for the picture as a whole. In addition, various other 
figures have made arguments supportive of this or similar positions; I can briefly review only 
a few here. The computational models developed by Reiji Suzuki and Takaya Arita have 
demonstrated that, given plausible assumptions about the selective advantages conferred by 
communicative ability, the sort of Baldwin Effects and similar assimilative processes 
hypothesised are indeed likely to have arisen (Suzuki & Arita 2013; Azumagakito et al. 
2013). Kim Sterelny has developed in great and illuminating detail the idea of human culture 
– and language in particular – as forming an ‘informational commons’ created by and co-
evolving with our ancestors as a way of sharing expertise in response to ‘a heterogeneous and 
changing environment’, in a classic piece of niche-constructionist theorising (2012a, p.76, 
138: see also Sterelny 2008; Sterelny 2012b).11  And Peter Ludlow posits what he terms ‘the 
Ψ-language hypothesis’, which holds that the psychological states which underlie language 
are internal to the speaker’s mind/brain, as Chomsky and his followers claim, but nonetheless 
‘individuated in part by the embedding environment’; he thereby seeks to show the 
interdependence of E-language and I-language in what appears to be a broadly similar (but 
                                                          
11 To be clear, Sterelny’s position is not a Chomskyan one. But it supports the claims made 
here about the role and importance of the community in language-acquisition processes, with 
which neo-Saussureans believe the Chomskyan position should be supplemented. 
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more formal than biological) manner to the neo-Saussurean view (2011, p.xv; see esp. p.44-
63). 
 
III: The Minimalist Evolutionary Hypothesis 
In recent years, despite their distaste for causal-historical explanations of the language 
faculty, Chomsky and some of his followers have produced a rival evolutionary hypothesis in 
support of a Minimalist version of the Thatcherite I-language view against which I argue in 
this paper (Hauser et al. 2014, Berwick & Chomsky 2016; cf. Fitch et al. 2005). Since it does 
not form part of that view as such, I discuss it here separately, focussing on the recent 
monograph by Chomsky and computational linguist Robert Berwick. Each stage of the 
argument, I shall claim, looks problematic in light of the neo-Saussurean literature, with 
which its authors make no attempt to engage. 
Berwick and Chomsky begin by invoking what they call ‘Darwin’s problem’; 
Darwinian explanation posits gradual change by the accumulation of tiny modifications, yet 
the human language faculty looks like a biological leap, not shared by any other animal and 
not functional in merely-partial forms. So what they describe as the ‘first motivation’ (p. 11) 
of their book is to effectively ‘shrink’ the explanandum. The language faculty that did evolve 
must be the kind of thing that could have evolved; therefore, they argue, since it could not 
have been produced gradualistically, and if we are not to invoke ‘saltation’, or large-scale 
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macro-mutations, the key elements of language must be small enough to be achievable by 
much smaller-scale macro-mutations.12 
This requirement is the key departure point for Berwick & Chomsky’s hypothesis; but 
the requirement is a spurious one. Since they regard E-language as merely epiphenomenal to 
the genetically-programmed I-language, Berwick and Chomsky reason as though functional 
advances in language must take place initially at the genetic level, or not at all. But there can 
scarcely be a feature of human language more familiar than our capacity for innovation and 
inventive play, which obviously does not require prior revision of the genome. So if some 
such novelties prove fitness-enhancing13 they can spread throughout the linguistic community 
in parole or E-language, before selection operates, via a Baldwin Effect, on the ability to 
learn them. It is just ‘when intermediates provide no benefit and a combination of 
simultaneous mutations needed to provide a functional whole is improbable,’ the very 
situation Berwick and Chomsky describe, that Baldwin Effects become important (Bateson 
2005, p.37). Thus, all necessarily saltation can happen at the level of linguistic praxis; 
                                                          
12 I won’t discuss the (extremely controversial) arguments Berwick and Chomsky rehearse 
(2016, p.26-39) for the possibility of non-gradualist evolutionary change; as I shall argue, 
the possibility is moot, since a better gradualistic explanation is available. 
13 As Patrick Bateson points out, creative play may have a very significant role in producing 
the sort of spontaneously developing behavioural structures on which the Baldwin Effect 
operates (Bateson 2006, p. 344). Linguistic ostentation may have sexual-selective benefits, 
while slang’s role providing in-group shibboleths could also have been adaptively 
significant (see e.g. Burling 1986). 
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subsequently the acquired behaviour can be genetically assimilated as gradually as one likes, 
without needing to be shrunk-to-fit.14  
Berwick and Chomsky bolster this claim that only a ‘minimal’ language faculty would 
be evolvable by pointing to ‘evolutionary theory’s evolution’ in recent years (p.16-39), in 
particular the importance which has increasingly been attributed to stochasticity. Both 
random drift and ‘directed stochastic variation in fitness, migration, and heritability’ (p.19), 
they argue, may thwart the prospects for any gradual adaptive process to produce and 
maintain a usable large-scale innovation for long enough that natural selection can act on it; 
‘individuals with [novel] traits must first climb out of a “stochastic gravity well” not 
governed by selection’ (p. 21), and that task is more tractable for smaller or rapidly-evolved 
traits. 
                                                          
14 This provides, in passing, a response to the charge that, by talking about the evolved 
language faculty as more than just the narrow capacity for recursive thought (the ‘faculty of 
language, narrowly construed’ or FLN) envisaged in Hauser et al. (2002), Fitch et al. 
(2005), and Berwick & Chomsky (2016), I am thereby equivocating on the term ‘language’, 
effectively ‘changing the subject’. It is the supposed need for a saltationist account of the 
faculty’s evolution which, per the ‘first motivation’, forces the FLN as subject matter upon 
Chomsky and his followers, so unrecognisably narrow from what linguists originally set out 
to study. With that need removed, generativists are free to investigate a much broader and 
more interesting target. I thank an anonymous reviewer both for pressing this objection and 
suggesting the solution. 
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This may present a problem for traditional, ‘gene-led’ accounts of adaptation, though 
the point is controversial.15 But despite the surprising insistence that ‘none of the recent 
accounts of human language evolution seem to have completely grasped the shift … to 
[Darwinism’s] fully stochastic modern version’ (p.19, emphases in original), the effect of 
invoking a Baldwin Effect is precisely to obviate such concerns. In that scenario, the ‘target’ 
behaviour is established and held in view by usage; by parole. This is what allows it to persist 
stably across generations without being inherited, while natural selection acts on variations in 
the ease of its expression. Thus ‘plastic modification [i.e. learning] within individuals might 
lead the process and a change in genes that influence the character would follow; the one 
paves the way for the other’ (Bateson 2005, p.35). Stochasticity does not thwart the Baldwin 
Effect; in fact, a certain amount of it appears necessary for the effect to work. Stochasticity 
generates a selection pressure for developmental plasticity in the organism, and as long as 
there is not too much stochasticity the Baldwin Effect allows that plasticity to be ‘traded’ for 
improved efficiency in learning (Ancel 1999; Bateson 2005, p.36). 
Based on these considerations, Berwick and Chomsky argue for a ‘strongly minimalist’ 
language faculty, consisting of just a single recursive operation – ‘Merge’ – and its interfaces 
with the existing conceptual and sensorimotor systems (2016, p.11 & passim). I don’t want to 
debate the linguistic or non-biological merits of the minimalist hypothesis here; the neo-
Saussurean account of language’s evolution is capable of accommodating it (Glackin 2011, p. 
214). But it is important to note that minimalism is not presented as an empirically testable 
conjecture (Hauser 2016; Hauser et al. 2014); so the case for it depends in large part upon the 
claims about its comparative evolvability, and if a non-minimalist language faculty is 
                                                          
15 The counter-argument is, typically, that drift and stochasticity cannot account for complex 
traits; Berwick and Chomsky respond, in effect, by positing that the trait in question is not 
complex. 
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perfectly evolvable via a Baldwin Effect, then the minimalist hypothesis itself may be 
unmotivated. In any event, the hypothesis does not provide support for the associated 
evolutionary conjectures which Chomsky and others have developed.  
 
IV: Quine’s Challenge 
Two major philosophical challenges to the generative theory, to which Chomsky’s 
answers were not wholly persuasive, concern the nature of the linguistic rules which speakers 
can be said to follow in their linguistic behaviour, or which can be neurally ‘encoded’ by their 
I-language states. 
The first of these is due to W.V. Quine (1970a). Generativists hold, in effect, that the 
rules of grammar – or, at any rate, a large subset of them – are held innately in a neural 
module in the individual speaker’s brain; and that the rest of the rules for a particular 
grammar ‘grow’ there during the language acquisition process. But Quine’s worry concerns 
whether any sense can be attached to this claim. 
Any given set of formulae, Quine showed, can be generated as theorems by any of a 
potentially infinite range of extensionally equivalent axiomatic systems. That is, for any set of 
sentences deemed grammatical, there are an infinite number of possible rules of 
grammaticality which would generate all and only the members of that set. So which are ‘the’ 
rules determining the grammaticality of, say, English sentences, which some speaker of the 
language knows, and which are consequently present in her brain? 
For adults, or those learning English as a foreign or second language, the question is 
easy to answer. If a native Danish speaker has learned English from Otto Jespersen’s 
Essentials of English Grammar, or from a traditional schoolroom textbook, it makes perfect 
sense to point to one or the other set of rules as they are written in the relevant text (Quine 
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1970a, p. 386). Under the aegis of general intelligence, the speaker learns a particular set of 
axioms, and thereafter applies them at the level of performance. But a child whose first 
language is English, and whose competence in the language is not tied to overall cognitive 
ability, is not following any particular set of rules in this sense; ‘(h)e just behaves in the way 
that the rules describe … any extensionally equivalent system of rules could be ascribed to 
him indifferently’ (Quine 1986, p.186).  We have, Quine concludes, no basis at all for saying 
that any set of rules – for it must be some particular set – is ‘in the brain’ in the sense that 
generativists require. 
Chomsky responded as though the objection concerned the underdetermination of 
theory by evidence (cf. Quine 1951), observing that not having enough data to definitively 
favour one hypothesis over all others was simply par for the course in any scientific 
endeavour (e.g. Chomsky 1969, p.67; 1980, p.14; 2000, ch.4). But as Quine’s somewhat 
exasperated response made clear (1969, p.302ff), his objection is really about another central 
theme of his work, the indeterminacy of translation; he held that there could be no ‘fact of the 
matter’ about which set of rules was being followed. That is, the problem was not that we 
don’t know the answer to the question of which set of rules is being followed, but that there 
can’t be one, even in principle. For Quine, behavioural evidence is meaning-constitutive for 
any such rules; so if we can’t distinguish the rules on the basis of behavioural evidence, no 
distinction can be drawn at all (1970b, p.180).16  
                                                          
16 See also the elucidation in Gibson (1986). Quine usually makes his arguments about 
indeterminacy with semantic meaning, rather than syntactic rules, in the cross-hairs; however, 
he does explicitly target them at Chomskyan syntactic rules in Quine (1969) and Quine 
(1970a). Quine would later repudiate the view that syntactic grammaticality was 
indeterminate in the same way as semantic translation, accepting instead that it was 
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The dispute has recently been revisited by Peter Ludlow, who appeals to the distinction 
between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ generative capacity in grammars. Grammarians, on this view, 
should be concerned with systems that generate not just the correct terminal strings or 
conventional sentences, but also the correct phrase markers. That is, simply producing words 
in an acceptable order is not enough if, as with ‘flying planes can be dangerous’, the 
underlying grammatical structure of the string is ambiguous. So a set of axioms for some 
language should not only generate the correct strings, but should assign them to the correct 
phrase structures (Ludlow 2011, p.103-104). A similar approach is sketched in Cain (2005, 
p.15). 
Does this underlying structure give us the ‘something more to go on’ than mere 
behavioural evidence, which we can use to deduce which set of rules is being followed? 
Perhaps. Quine himself, attributing the idea to Peter Geach (1965, p.201), suggested that 
looking for ‘the whole tree rather than just the well-formed strings that it issues in’ could in 
principle persuade us that a particular set of rules was being followed (1970a, p.391). But this 
approach, he cautioned, would require identifying which are the correct structures, and it’s 
not clear that we have any better way to do that – Ludlow suggests none – than canvassing 
the assent of native speakers, thereby returning us to the circle of indeterminacy. Nor is it 
obvious that this solution can sit comfortably with the idiolectical character that Chomsky’s 
‘Thatcherism’ ascribes to I-language. 
                                                          
‘adequately determined by behavioral dispositions.’ (1987, p.10). However, he nowhere states 
his reasons for this volte-face. Quine’s indeterminacy argument has been widely criticised; 
but the more robust version ‘reconstructed’ in Lance & Hawthorne (1998) would present the 
same problems for generativist linguistics. 
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The neo-Saussurean view provides an alternative possibility for the ‘more imaginative’ 
and ‘less direct’ route that Quine sought to identification of the phrase-structure rules actually 
operative in the speaker’s brain (1970a, p.392). This view posits that linguistic rules are 
initially learned by our ancestors as performance, or parole, similarly to the contemporary 
non-native speaker’s acquisition of a second-or-subsequent language. New linguistic rules 
may be generated in public language via utterances, without ever being explicitly formulated, 
so that no resource such as Jespersen’s Elements is available to the learner. Nevertheless, as – 
by definition – a non-native with regard to novel constructions, such a learner is clearly 
envisaged by Quine (1970a) as being able to hypothesise and follow some particular rule or 
set of rules, as opposed to any equivalent one generating the same sentences; and it is those 
particular rules which are used, and progressively ‘sedimented’ into the ‘Universal Grammar’ 
(UG) – the invariant core of common structural principles generativists believe to be shared 
by all human languages – until they no longer need to be learned, by subsequent generations. 
This leaves open the possibility that many speakers will formulate and genetically assimilate 
many different extensionally equivalent codifications of the same linguistic behaviour.17 But 
it seems unlikely that the different neural mechanisms would continue, through several 
millennia of language change, to produce extensionally equivalent grammars for every 
subsequent human language, nor that all such mechanisms would be equally amenable to the 
‘grafting on’ of subsequent linguistic innovations. So ongoing language change and language 
innovation generates a selection pressure for standardisation; one of the various 
neurolinguistic phenotypes would have coped better with the frequent changes in the 
linguistic environment, and spread across the population.18  
                                                          
17 Cf. Quine’s own ‘topiary’ metaphor (1960, p. 8). 
18 Of course, this is merely a speculative hypothesis, requiring empirical confirmation. But 
the fact that it or something like it is an empirical possibility means that the theoretical 
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 The ‘hardwiring’ of those rules by the Baldwin Effect can thus be thought of as 
functionally analogous to an adult learner writing down the rules he is taught for ease of 
reference in the future; but a particular set is ultimately written down, and it is not 
‘indifferent’ which. So Quine’s worry that there is no fact of the matter which set of rules a 
native speaker is using does not apply; the particular set may prove epistemically 
inaccessible, but its identity is a matter of history. 
 
V: ‘Kripkenstein’s’ Challenge  
There is another, better-known challenge to Chomsky’s conception of linguistic rules, 
which is described though not explicitly endorsed by Saul Kripke (1982), and based on 
Wittgenstein’s celebrated discussions of ‘rule-following’ (1953, §§138-243 & passim; 1981, 
s.VI & passim). Though he is, like Quine, chiefly concerned with the possibility of 
determinate semantic meaning, Kripke likewise turns the argument’s fire explicitly on 
Chomsky’s syntactic theories. Words and expressions have meaning, Wittgenstein argued, 
only in the context of their use in a ‘language-game’. The proper use of words and 
expressions is therefore governed by the rules of the language-games in which they occur. 
Meaning is consequently normative; it results from following a set of rules for correct usage, 
                                                          
problem can be solved; it does not, as Quine thinks, render the generativist’s claims 
incoherent in principle. 
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and is the kind of thing we can get wrong.19 But this raises the question; how can we tell if we 
are applying a given rule ‘correctly’?20 
In a famous example, Wittgenstein asks us to imagine teaching somebody the rule ‘add 
2’. We teach him ‘0, 2, 4, 6, 8 …’, and then tell him ‘now carry on as before’. He does so, but 
upon reaching a thousand begins ‘1004, 1008, 1012 …’. This is wrong, we tell him; carry on 
the way you were before. But this is, he responds, what he was doing before (1953, §§185).  
As Kripke develops the point, we may imagine two distinct rules in play here, the 
conventional one for addition (plus) and the non-standard one (‘quus’). If all prior evidence – 
every computation I have made below one thousand, or some other hypothetically never-
previously-encountered figure – is consistent with either function, then my belief that I have 
been following the plus-rule rather than the quus-rule all this time seems impossible to justify, 
to myself or others. Nothing will serve as evidence: I cannot point to my prior behaviour, 
since the two rules diverge only in novel cases; I cannot appeal to a more basic procedure, 
like counting, since this merely supports the rule with another rule (how can I know that I 
                                                          
19 See e.g. Lance & Hawthorne (1998); Blackburn (1984); Brandom (1994); McDowell (1989), 
ch. 11. 
20 The views of ‘Kripkenstein’, notoriously, are generally regarded as not reflecting 
Wittgenstein’s own, principally because they conflate his discussions of rule-following and 
private language (Kripke 1982, p. 3); however, they do thereby stress the same relevant 
themes of the essential publicity and normativity of language. I focus the discussion here on 
Kripke’s account rather than a more orthodox Wittgensteinianism largely for historical 
reasons; it was Kripke who first applied the rule-following considerations to Chomsky’s 
generative linguistics, and Kripke’s formulation of them to which Chomsky (1986) would 
explicitly respond. See note 23 below. 
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have not, all this time, really been quounting?); nor can my mental contents settle the matter, 
since these are generally neither necessary nor sufficient to fix meaning.21 
There is another intuitive option; perhaps it is true that I have never tried to add a 
number over one thousand, but I was nevertheless in a state of disposition to do so according 
to one rule rather than the other. That is, my meaning plus rather than quus is constituted by 
the fact that had I attempted to add two to one thousand, I would have given the answer 
‘1002’ rather than ‘1004’. But this purported solution ignores what Wittgenstein and his 
followers regard as the fundamental normativity of language; we need a distinction between 
the answer I would have given and the answer I ought to give. Perhaps I am simply a tired, a 
distracted, or an incompetent arithmetician, and prone to making mistakes. Using the 
dispositionalist method, as Wittgenstein says, ‘whatever is going to seem right to me is right. 
And that only means that here we can't talk about “right”’ (1953, §§258).  
The argument has inspired a voluminous literature, but we need not concern ourselves 
here with the numerous suggestions that subsequent philosophers have made for ‘straight’ 
solutions to the ‘sceptical paradox’.22 Most of this literature is concerned with the possibility 
or impossibility of semantic meaning, which is Kripke’s principal target throughout the book. 
There is a secondary target present, however, and what is important for our present purposes 
is the way Kripke explicitly applied his ‘Wittgensteinian’ argument to Chomsky’s linguistics, 
and the ‘sceptical solution’ by which he proposed to neutralise its force. 
                                                          
21 Nor are they, in any case, available to a Chomskyan grammatical competence, which must 
work both independently of general cognitive capacity, and according to rules of which the 
follower is typically unaware. 
22 See e.g. the essays collected in eds. Miller & Wright (2002). 
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If a speaker ‘follows a rule’ in isolation from any linguistic community, Kripke posits, 
then there is indeed no difference between his truly following the rule he intends and his 
merely thinking that he is doing so. Since meaning must be normative – the kind of thing we 
can ‘get wrong’ – a meaningful ‘private language’ would be impossible; an I-language could 
not be normative in this way. Rule-following can therefore take place only in a linguistic 
community, where others can judge if we are following the rule correctly. Ascriptions of 
meaning, such as judging that a speaker means plus rather than quus, thus have a utility; they 
allow us to distinguish between those we can and cannot trust in our linguistic transactions. 
The idea of linguistic rules therefore makes essential reference to the linguistic community; 
meaning is an intrinsically public matter. 
Now, while Kripke is like Quine primarily concerned with semantic rules, he does 
explicitly discuss the argument’s application to syntactic rules of just the sort that Chomsky 
discusses. And while Kripke is careful to state that he himself is supportive of Chomsky’s 
position (1982, p.30-1, fn.22), he is also clear that the ‘Kripkensteinian’ argument causes 
problems for that view. ‘Competence’ in the sense that generativists seemed to use it, he 
notes, is ‘not a dispositional notion. It is normative, not descriptive ... [it] is dependent on our 
understanding of the idea of “following a rule”’ (ibid.).23 And this means that ‘(m)odern 
transformational linguistics, inasmuch as it explains all my specific utterances by my “grasp” 
of syntactic and semantic rules … seems to give an explanation of the type Wittgenstein 
would not permit’ (1982, p.97, fn.77; cf. McNally & McNally 2012). 
                                                          
23 Tellingly, it was following the publication of Kripke’s lectures, and in the same work in 
which he responded to these (Chomsky 1986), that Chomsky first replaced the term 
‘competence’ with ‘I-language’.  
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Chomsky insists, in response, that grammar should be regarded as consisting not of 
rules, but of principles and parameters (e.g. 1986, p.688ff.; 1995, p.17). This has looked to 
some like philosophical stone-kicking, as though he were purporting to distinguish between 
normative grammatical rules and meta-rules for generating them which, for unexplained 
reasons, were not themselves normative. But that is a misreading; what is actually revealed by 
this move of Chomsky’s is the much more radical view that there are no rules in language at 
all. This rejection of rules is part of his rejection of E-language as unscientific; language as an 
object of proper scientific study cannot be a set of abstract, formal norms, but must rather be 
concrete, ‘a real object of the real world’, ‘as real as chemical compounds’ (Chomsky 1993, 
p.39; Chomsky 1988, p.679. Cf. e.g. Katz 1981). 
Language as an object of scientific interest, then, is not normative at all on Chomsky’s 
view, but natural and biological.24 And as such, it is a property of individual speakers’ brains. 
That is to say, ‘public languages’ do not exist. ‘People who live near the Dutch border,’ notes 
Chomsky, ‘can communicate quite well with people living on the German side, but they 
speak different languages in accordance with the sense of the term Dummett argues is 
“fundamental”’ (1992, p.101). That is, so-called ‘public languages’ are distinguished only by 
factors of class, politics, or race; their differences are not linguistic.  Nor are the brains of, 
say, English, Finnish, and Japanese speakers interestingly different (Chomsky 1988, p.677). 
So there is no abstract, differentiated object such as ‘the French language’, in which native 
speakers of French partake, and according to whose normative standards their linguistic 
performance is to be judged. All that exists, for the linguist, are substantially overlapping and 
purely descriptive idiolects; neural structures internal to the minds of individual speakers, 
which happen in many cases to be similar enough to permit communication between peers. 
                                                          
24 Millikan (2003) provides a nice dissection of this opposition. 
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This is the position I have described as Chomsky’s ‘linguistic Thatcherism’; there is, he 
believes, no such thing as society as far as a scientific linguistics is concerned, just individual 
men and women. And if it follows that no community is available to safeguard the 
Wittgensteinian normativity of language, then that is a bullet Chomsky is happy to bite. The 
individual speaker cannot be ‘wrong’ in his linguistic behaviour; he can only be – as a matter 
of fact – unable to make himself understood (Chomsky 2000, p.7). An empirical science is 
concerned with what does happen, and not what should; prescription ‘plainly has nothing to 
do with an eventual science of language, but involves other notions having to do with 
authority, class structure, and the like’ (Chomsky 1988, p.675; cf. more generally Isac & 
Reiss 2008, ch.12).25 
That linguistic prescriptions have often illegitimately been used as tools of social 
control is not in doubt, though someone of more liberal inclinations than Chomsky might 
conclude that we simply need to be much more fine-grained and inclusive about the shifting, 
overlapping, large and small speech communities which we interpret as autonomous bearers 
of their own normative standards. As to the picture of I-language as individualistic and purely 
                                                          
25 It has become customary since the publication of Hattiangadi (2006) to distinguish between 
the claim that meaning is ‘normative’, so that a speaker ought to apply a rule in a particular 
way, and the weaker claim that it is ‘norm-relative’, so that she speaks correctly in some sense 
if she does so. Hattiangadi takes the first to be untenable (since it would e.g. commit a speaker 
to always telling the truth), and the second to be too ‘anodyne’ to support Kripke’s meaning-
sceptical paradox (p.7). Chomsky seems to me to be committed to denying both normativity 
and norm-relativity about syntax; certainly, in rejecting ‘prescriptivism’, he evidently denies 
the stronger claim. I am happy, conversely, to uphold it; even if Hattiangadi’s argument is 
successful, it pertains only to semantic applications of the rule-following paradox, and doesn’t 
affect normativism about the syntactic rules of grammar. 
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descriptive, it is at least suggestive to observe the tension between this and the classic 
generativist account of Creole formation; children acquiring language appear to ‘look for’ – 
and ‘discover’ – the parameter-settings of the target grammar in accordance with UG 
principles, even in deformed and disordered linguistic environments where no such settings 
exist (Bickerton 1983; Kegl et al. 1999). In other words, the development of a speaker’s I-
language seems, in some sense, to ‘expect’ the presence of an E-language. Nor need this talk 
be taken as merely metaphorical; just as John Maynard Smith justified the attribution of 
intentionality to the information encoded in the genome as the result of natural selection, so 
Ruth Garret Millikan has defended at length the teleology of ‘proper functions’. The E-
language or langue represents the ‘Normal conditions’ required by the I-language to develop 
properly so as to perform its evolved proper function; it ‘has helped to proliferate the [I-
language] mechanisms … during the historical selection processes that formed them’ 
(Millikan 2017, p.85). There is therefore a biologically robust sense in which these intentional 
and teleological claims can be cashed out. 
Millikan’s proper functions also provide a clear sense in which, contrary to Chomsky’s 
claims, biolanguage appears to possess at least some intrinsically normative features. The 
features of the linguistic brain attributable to natural selection will have a proper function in 
the standard way (Millikan 1989, p.288); these present features of our brains originated as 
copies of the same features of our ancestors’ brains in part because those features allowed our 
ancestors to acquire and use certain grammatical structures, and these present features exist 
because (causally and historically) of that acquisition and use. Brains that do not carry out 
their proper functions – reproduce the appropriate grammatical structures – are thereby 
dysfunctional; they are not doing what they are supposed to do.  
The features of the mature linguistic brain not attributable to natural selection – the 
particular parameter settings left open by the LAD and determined instead by the practices of 
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the linguistic community the child finds herself in – likewise have a derived proper function 
(ibid.). That is, these features originate as the product of some prior device – the LAD – that, 
given its circumstances, has the acquisition and use of grammatical structures as a proper 
function and that, under those circumstances, normally causes such structures to be acquired 
and used by means of producing a fully-developed linguistic brain. And more; the linguistic 
practices of the community, too, originate as the product of numerous I-languages and LADs 
that, given their circumstances, have the performance of various linguistic tasks as their 
proper function and that, under those circumstances, normally cause such tasks to be 
performed by means of producing such linguistic practices. And so – insofar as biolanguage 
is regarded as properly biological – an individual’s failure to reproduce the grammatical 
structures specified by her developmental parameter settings and the practices of her 
community will likewise count as errors of a sort whose possibility Chomsky rejects.  
The collectivist, neo-Saussurean view has a straightforward solution to Kripke’s 
challenge, which ‘saves the phenomena’ by preserving our common-sense intuition about the 
normativity of grammar; the rules of grammar – both the ubiquitous rules which form the 
UG, and the parochial standards specific to a given speech-community – are part of the public 
langue, held not completely in the individual speaker, but in collective practice. That means 
that Kripke’s problem does not arise; judgements of linguistic competence on this view are 
both public and normative. ‘Following a rule’ of grammar, then, is nothing more than 
conforming to community standards; and the LAD is best thought of as a specialised module 
for helping the speaker to align herself with those standards quickly and easily, without 
reliance on general intelligence. 
As to the point that the judgements of competence we are concerned with here are 
typically political in nature, this is undoubtedly true. But once again, a fully rich view of 
human biology sees us as characteristically social animals, the most salient feature of whose 
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environment is our interactions with our peers and fellows. We are, as Aristotle recognised, 
fundamentally political animals; the idea that a political judgement cannot thereby also be a 
linguistic one, since linguistics is part of biology and politics is not, hangs on a deeply 
impoverished notion of the human animal and its typical forms of life, one I earlier described 
as ‘Thatcherite’. No doubt it is regrettable that community standards are used to exclude and 
subjugate, but the appropriate solution to this is political liberalism rather than theoretical 
eliminativism; we should recognise a much greater number and variety of shifting, 
overlapping, and often ephemeral communities as the legitimate and autonomous bearers of 
linguistic norms, rather than denying that such norms exist, or that they are part of language. 
 
VI: Collective Rule-following and the Arbitrariness of Langue  
Here is an influential objection which Simon Blackburn has levelled against Kripke’s 
purportedly ‘Wittgensteinian’ reasoning, which will help us draw further links between 
biological theory and Saussurean views of language:  
If the presence or potential presence of a community of persons practising the 
same way enters as part of the truth-conditions, part of the analysis, of what it is to 
follow a rule, the sceptic who won against the private individual looks equally set to win 
against a community which has the benefit of mutual support (Blackburn 1984, p.295). 
That is, if a solitary speaker has no further, ‘ultimate’ basis for distinguishing between his 
following a rule and his merely thinking he is doing so, neither can the linguistic community 
Kripkenstein appeals to; they, too, lack the means to distinguish between collectively 
following a rule and merely thinking that they are doing so.  
We can sharpen the point of this objection with a well-known insight due to David Hull 
and Michael Ghiselin (e.g. Hull 1976; Hull 1978; Ghiselin 1974; Ghiselin 1997). A species, 
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or a biologically or biolinguistically significant subgroup of the sort that sustains a collection 
of normative linguistic practices over time, can be regarded in simply mereological terms, as 
the class of its members. But – much as I argued that a merely mereological or ‘Thatcherite’ 
view of public language as the sum of individual speakers and their utterances left us unable 
to explain what seem to be some of its key features – Hull and Ghiselin argue that we better 
understand such lineages as spatio-temporal individuals, acting together with unity and 
coherence of collective ‘purpose’, and pooling the genetic, behavioural, and environmental 
resources of each constituent organism to create ‘homeostatic systems … amazingly well-
buffered to resist change and maintain stability in the face of disturbing influences’ (Eldredge 
and Gould 1972, p.114; quoted in Hull 1978, p.343). 
So one way to think of the linguistic community (ultimately, the species; but similarly 
for any of the cross-cutting and overlapping subsidiary groups providing speech-norms of 
greater or lesser currency and duration) is as an individual in its own right, which invents or 
modifies the langue as an ‘artefact’ or technology, and trains itself over time to its use. 
Blackburn’s challenge then becomes; if nothing internal or specific to an individual organism 
can provide a normative standard for his or her use of language, what could provide the same 
standard for the langue as a whole, as used by the wider linguistic community-individual? 
The objection looks successful, but not troublesome. It establishes, rightly, that there is 
no higher or external standard which could be appealed to in judging the grammatical 
standards of a community, or species, as a whole to be ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’. In that respect, 
the community- or species-individual is in the same boat as the individual speaker. But at the 
same time, it is hard to see what sense could be attached to any such judgement, as it pertains 
to a community or species, in the way that there is clearly something substantive and readily 
comprehensible for Chomsky to deny is predicable of idiolectical speakers. What could it 
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even mean to say that all French speakers, or indeed all human speakers adhering to universal 
principles like that of subjacency, were ungrammatical in the rules they observed? 
In fact this question leads us back, once more, to Saussure. In the Cours de Linguistique 
Générale, he famously declares as ‘the first principle’ of linguistics, the fact that ‘the 
linguistic sign is arbitrary’ (1983, p.67). That is, no natural connection exists, even in cases of 
onomatopoeia, between any given sign, or signal, and the thing it signifies. But this is not 
merely an obvious point about vocabulary, Saussure maintains; it is ‘the organising principle 
for the whole of linguistics, considered as a science of language structure,’ and so applicable 
equally to grammatical rules (1983, p.68). 
But to say that a signal is arbitrary does not mean that it is either conventional or 
volitional. The parole a speaker produces is volitional, in that it is the freely-chosen 
expression of an individual will; I may choose to say one thing, rather than another. 
Conventions, in turn, are ‘practice(s) which people are free to adopt, adapt, flout, or change 
by mutual agreement’ (Harris 1990, p.49). But langue is neither of these things; ‘the 
individual has no power to alter a sign in any respect once it has become established in a 
community’ (Saussure 1983, p. 68). There is a whiff of paradox here, certainly, since signs 
are established in langue just by their adoption in parole. But while langue may alter over 
time, it is equally anchored by continuity with past usage, and the new speaker so comes to 
and must experience its standards as inflexible (1983, p.74). Nevertheless, Saussure stresses, 
it is ‘unmotivated’; so thoroughly does it lack any grounding external to itself that a 
‘community of language users’ intent on reforming it could find ‘no issue … to discuss,’ no 
independent criteria at all for its revision (1983, p.73).  
  This leaves us just where our reflection on Blackburn’s objection to Kripkenstein and 
the Hull-Ghiselin species-as-individuals thesis did. From the perspective of the individual 
speaker, the rules of langue are normative and unbending; though she may move between 
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communities, socially or geographically, her speech at any moment may be judged 
grammatical or ungrammatical by the lights of her current linguistic environment. But the 
community’s use of these same rules is not normative at all, but incorrigible; from a 
collective point of view, any other set of rules might just as well have been chosen, and thus 
no normative standard exists to which the rules operative in any particular linguistic 
environment could even in principle be answerable.26 
Of course, this does not really answer Blackburn’s worry, which is that just as for the 
individual speaker, there will be nothing which constitutes a ‘fact of the matter’ whether a 
community is following the same rules as it did in the past, or merely thinking that it is doing 
so. But this is a separate question from that of whether a normative standard is available for 
judgements of correct or incorrect usage of grammatical rules. For the individual speaker, that 
standard can be given by community assent; for the speech-community, no such standard is 
available or necessary. 
 
VII: Conclusion 
                                                          
26 The point I am making does not depend on a particular view of the metaphysics of species, 
and so can be equally well made in the language of kinds, though the issues are perhaps less 
clear: from the perspective of the individual speaker of language, a given set of practices at a 
time form a Nash Equilibrium, so no individual speaker can profitably unilaterally depart from 
those practices, though the community can; and the equilibrium is not stable, and is readily 
perturbed, which is why those sets of practices change over time. I am indebted to Kim 
Sterelny both for this observation and for this reformulation of the point. 
35 
 
If we take seriously the idea that a science of linguistics should be regarded as a branch 
of human biology, then consonance with the best current biological theories is an important 
desideratum. And the communitarian account of biolanguage, I have argued, scores far better 
by this measure than the individualist one. As I have shown, it also defuses two well-known 
philosophical problems for generative grammar. 
Both the communitarian and individualistic theories substantially accept the ‘core’ or 
‘classic’ Chomskyan, generativist account of how language is initially acquired by the 
speaker, on the basis of an interaction between the linguistic information present in her 
environment and her innate specialisation for linguistic behaviour. They share, too, a 
commitment to Chomsky’s views about the substantially invariant structure of all natural 
human languages which results. But the two views differ radically in the relationship they 
posit between the individual speaker and the community and its practices which constitute his 
or her linguistic environment. 
On the dominant view, that environment is simply a pre-existing theatre for the 
development of a speaker’s idiolect. Chomskyans do not, of course, deny that an appropriate 
developmental environment is necessary if the child is to acquire language successfully; but 
in the presence of such an environment, which they hold amounts to nothing more than the 
sum of other idiolects in the vicinity, the process of development simply unfolds according to 
a genetic program. But this understanding sits very ill with the shift in recent decades away 
from genocentric, individualistic pictures of evolutionary and developmental biology. And 
though this shift remains controversial, Chomsky and his followers have professed their 
enthusiasm for it (e.g. Chomsky 2007a; Chomsky 2007b, p.18; Piatelli-Palmarini 2008). If 
any view of the biology in biolinguistics now seems ‘facile’, it is the orthodoxy. 
The alternative view of biolinguistics emphasises collaboration and interdependence at 
all levels: between genetic and environmental information in guiding human development, 
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between humans and their physical and cultural environment in shaping each other over the 
course of their evolutionary history, and between individual humans and their communities 
and societies. It posits a deep, reciprocal, and historically-extended interplay and dependence 
between what ‘goes on’ linguistically inside, and outside, the speaker’s head. This public, 
communitarian, and normative view of language repudiates the ‘linguistic Thatcherism’ of 
Chomsky’s position, with its purely reductive view of human sociality; as I hope I have 
shown, it thereby far better reflects our best current scientific account of what it is, 
biologically speaking, to be human.27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 I am grateful to audiences at the International Society for the History, Philosophy, and 
Social Sciences of Biology, the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the 
University of Cambridge, and the Biological Interest Group at the University of Exeter, for 
their feedback on earlier versions of this paper. I am also grateful to Kim Sterelny and 
several anonymous reviewers for their comments, including one who declared my argument 
to be "as stupid as it is offensive", thereby emboldening me to adopt John Dupré's 
suggestion of a less conciliatory title. 
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